battle of ap bac casualties

The 173rd and 175th companies blocked the far western position side as Task Force C, but it was not committed to battle. After a skirmish on a highway that resulted in a small number of South Vietnamese casualties along with several trucks destroyed, Cao was called to Saigon and reprimanded by Diem. [11] Cao was promoted to general and assumed command of the new IV Corps Tactical Zone, which included the area of operations of his 7th Infantry Division. The battle of Ap Bac, sixty-five kilometers southwest of Saigon in the Mekong Delta in January 1963, illustrates the early problems faced by the developing armored forces of the ARVN . [25], In the days before the battle, Hoang anticipated a major attack from the South Vietnamese government, as VC intelligence agents in Dinh Tuong had reported the arrival of 71 truckloads of ammunition and other supplies from Saigon, about 65 kilometers (40 mi) to the northeast. 24-June 26 July 1967: Operations in eastern Long An Province, principally in CAN GIOUC and CAN DUOC Districts. The Battle of Ap Bac was a major Viet Cong victory. Their positions were well-concealed by trees and shrubs, which made them difficult to see from the air and provided good protection from heavy weaponry. [2], Large-scale American support began during the Kennedy Administration in the early 1960s, with the arrival of large numbers of the U.S. Special Forces to help out in the field. Diem was more interested in using the military to protect his regime than to take on the VC. [3] The arrival of helicopters changed the nature of the battle considerably; it enabled South Vietnamese soldiers to quickly fly to almost any point in the country, leaving little time for a retreat. Despite the change in leadership, the same problems continued to manifest themselves in the 7th Infantry Division. He was fearful that the battle would turn out to be the largest defeat of South Vietnamese forces up to that point of the war. While they lost only 18 killed and 39 wounded, the South Vietnamese suffered 83 killed, 108 wounded and 5 helicopters lost. They marched south in three separate axes towards their objective. Battle of Ap Bac was the first major battle in the Vietnam war. The artillery rounds killed another five South Vietnamese soldiers and wounded fourteen others. The flamethrower had a range of up to 200 meters (660 ft),[39] but when the operator fired the device, the flame died after only 30 meters (98 ft). Also 1 company operation each week in RSSZ. On several occasions, Cao's forces were in excellent position to trap and wipe out whole battalions of Viet Cong, but he would fail to close the trap on one pretext or another and allow the enemy to escape. 81. [20], An operations plan suited for an attack on a small enemy formation was drafted by Ziegler, who was an adviser to Dam and the command staff of the 7th Infantry Division. [51] As night fell, Hoang knew that South Vietnamese forces were closing in from three directions. [22] Hoang knew the Civil Guard battalions were approaching, so he instructed his company commander in Ap Bac to be ready, as they would fire the first shots of the battle. [15], In 1962, Diem decided to split the command of the area in the south around Saigon into two, the former III Corps area being reduced in size to cover the area northeast of Saigon, and the newly created IV Corps taking over the west and southwest. As a result, Dam could only send one company at a time onto the battlefield. The wounded Viet Cong soldiers were transferred onto sampans at the canal on the eastern side of Ap Tan Thoi, while the rest of the formation marched on. [5], The most successful South Vietnamese force had been the 7th Infantry Division, then under the command of Colonel Huynh Van Cao. He considered the operation to be a major success; after the VC abandoned their positions, the South Vietnamese units captured the hamlets of Ap Bac and Ap Tan Thoi. September 28, 1999. Sergeant Arnold Bowers, who had ridden in the first crashed helicopter, raced back and forth to rescue injured American airmen. [53] The 1st Company, 261st Battalion, led the column, followed by litter carriers carrying the dead and wounded. [45] At 10:00 pm, Viet Cong commander Hoang led his two companies out of Ap Tan Thoi and headed for their base camp in the Plain of Reeds, while the local force units left by a different route for their hideouts in the local area. [20], In the days before the battle, Hoang anticipated a major attack from the South Vietnamese government, as Viet Cong intelligence agents in Dinh Tuong had reported the arrival of 71 truckloads of ammunition and other supplies from Saigon, about 65 kilometers (40 mi) to the northeast. They successfully stopped the well-equipped South Vietnamese army, supported by a combination of artillery and armored units as well as American airpower. The radio intercept and other information obtained by Jim Drummond, Vann's intelligence officer, indicated that the Viet Cong were using Ap Tan Thoi as a headquarters location. American advisers Captain Fletcher Ware and Sergeant Russell Kopti, who had parachuted in with the South Vietnamese, were also wounded. When the leading Civil Guard battalion came within 30 meters (98 ft) of the southern end of Ap Bac, the Viet Cong opened fire from their foxholes and immediately killed the leading company's commander and wounded the task force commander. [19] Together, elements of the Viet Cong 261st and 514th Battalions in Ap Tan Thoi and Ap Bac formed a 'composite battalion', which was placed under the command of Colonel Hai Hoang. [2] However, Diem's campaign was too successful to allow them to do nothing, and small-scale actions broke out across the country. [46], Vann wanted to use a C-47 flare plane to illuminate the rice fields on the eastern flank of Ap Bac and Ap Tan Thoi. At that time, North Viet­nam was hop­ing for an elec­tion, promised under the Geneva Ac­cords of 1954, that would unite North and South Viet­nam. They make the same mistake over and over again in the same way". The operation concluded on 21 June, U.S. casualties were 46 killed and 15 sailors wounded, while claiming VC losses of 255 killed. [9] Cao used the excellent military intelligence network they had developed to find areas devoid of the Viet Cong, and planned operations only in those areas. [35] By 10:30, all the South Vietnamese soldiers who had landed on the field were under heavy fire from inside Ap Bac and refused to move. David Toczek, a serving U.S. Army officer and former history professor at the United States Military Academy, has written the definitive treatment of the battle of Ap Bac, a minor action in January 1963 that had major implications. [14] It intercepted radio signals in the hamlet of Ap Tan Thoi in Dinh Tuong Province where the ARVN 7th Infantry Division was headquartered. They make the same mistake over and over again in the same way". They got away, that's what happened"! An assessment done in the Department of State on January 15 of press reaction across the country to the battle of Ap Bac noted that “since Ap Bac the complaint has been increasingly heard that the American public is not ‘getting the facts’ on the situation in Viet-nam, even at this time when American casualties are mounting.” (“Alert” on Viet-Nam: Current American Concern and Misunderstanding; … [37] The VC fired on the exposed soldiers and killed several. When reporter Neil Sheehan asked Brig. In short, the Viet Cong enjoyed a great advantage over any attacking force. Ap Bac had many as yet undefined consequences for the South Vietnamese government and the American involvement in Vietnam. With the ground attacks in the north and south bogged down, Dam decided to stretch out the defending VC units by attacking the east and the west. Upon his return, Vann and his group of advisers were forced to end the joint planning sessions that had been so successful earlier, and action essentially wound down in their region. [32], Scanlon, with the help of Bowers, ran forward to aid the wounded men and carry them back to the M-113 formation. The lead troop carrier commenced its final approach and aimed for a landing area 200 metres west of the VC. In contrast, Hoang was far more relaxed and commanded a high degree of confidence from the soldiers of the 261st Battalion. When Vann threatened to have Ba shot, he reluctantly continued to advance, although very slowly, toward the entrenched Viet Cong. [1], Ap Bac had many as yet undefined consequences for the South Vietnamese government and the American involvement in Vietnam. An argument broke out between Vann and Ba. The guerillas quickly launched an "Ap Bac emulation drive" to encourage further feats of such prowess, and Party historians mark this battle as the start of their ability to engage the Americans on a large scale. The Battle of Ap Bau Bang (Vietnamese: trận Bàu Bàng) took place on the morning of 12 November 1965 when two regiments from the Viet Cong (VC) 9th Division attacked a night defensive position of the United States 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment (2/2nd Infantry) at a small village by the name of Bàu Bàng, 25 km north of Thủ Dầu Một. They evacuated through the rice fields, taking their dead and wounded comrades. The 15 US helicopters ferrying the troops were riddled by VC gunfire and five helicopters were lost as a result. [49] Shortly afterward, more than eighteen hours too late, the South Vietnamese hit Ap Bac with an artillery barrage. [17] The M-113 carriers and the infantry company could act as both a mobile reserve and a reaction force, so it was positioned where it could be shifted to the contact area if the Viet Cong began to retreat. [25], Previously, leadership of the 261st Battalion alternated between Hoang, a South Vietnamese revolutionary who had returned from North Vietnam after 1954, and Tu Khue, who was a native of North Vietnam. [18] Between 28–30 December 1962, an American aircraft equipped with eavesdropping equipment located a VC radio transmitter. In response, Vann asked his pilot to make low passes over the trees which covered Ap Bac. The Battle of Ap Bac was the first significant engagement between tenets of North and South Vietnam. [56], Arrival of the armored personnel carriers, The regiment were divided into three separate task forces for the operation against Ap Tan Thoi. Just when the M113 crews closed in on their objective, a VC squad leader and his men jumped out of their foxholes and tossed grenades at the lead formation of the attack force. [27] As Vann's L-19 aircraft flew over the western tree line, the Viet Cong watched from their foxholes, but held their fire because they knew the aircraft was trying to draw fire in order to mark their positions. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2007, $19.95 . The ARVN 4th Mechanized Rifle Squadron was then deployed to rescue the South Vietnamese soldiers and US aircrews who were trapped at the southwest end of Ap Bac, but its commander was highly reluctant to move heavy M113 APCs across the local terrain. [8] The lightly armed VC had no weaponry capable of stopping the armored carriers and inevitably were forced to flee, taking heavy casualties. Thus, due to his strong leadership skills and popularity, Hoang was selected to take command of Viet Cong forces for operations in Ap Bac. [55] Militarily, the morale and confidence of Viet Cong commanders and soldiers, who had experienced serious setbacks during the previous year, were significantly boosted. These tactics, combined with the use of armored personnel carriers, took a heavy toll on various fledgling VC units. The Battle of Ấp Bắc was a major battle fought on January 3, 1963, during the Vietnam War. Later, two AD-6 Skyraiders arrived over Ap Bac and attacked the thatched houses with conventional bombs and napalm. During that time, artillery support was ineffective, as Civil Guard forward observers would not stand up to observe the fall of artillery rounds. At that time, North Vietnam was hoping for an election, promised under the Geneva Accords of 1954, that would unite North and South Vietnam. [19] It intercepted radio signals in the hamlet of Ap Tan Thoi in Dinh Tuong Province where the ARVN 7th Infantry Division was headquartered. [40] In his final effort to defeat the Viet Cong, Vann flew into Tan Hiep and asked Cao to deploy an airborne battalion on the eastern side of Ap Bac, the most logical retreat route for the Viet Cong. [1] However, in 1963, the VC had changed its policy from avoiding the ARVN to standing and fighting. Ultimately, their presence made little difference as the NLF stood their ground and killed more than a dozen South Vietnamese M-113 crew members in the process. The PAVN have never released their casualties for Dai Do, but claimed victory stating that they had defeated 3 Marine Battalions and elements of the non-existent US 73rd Air Cavalry Brigade on 2 May, killing over 500 Americans. It was fought by the ARVN and NVA at Ap Bac – a village in Dinh Tuong province, approximately 50 miles southwest of Saigon on January 2, 1962. Consequently, one artillery round after another fell behind VC positions, instead of on their foxholes. An argument broke out between Vann and Ba. It came at a time when both sides were hungry for a decisive victory to galvanize their fortunes. [44], By that stage, Vann was frustrated by the Civil Guard soldiers of Task Force B, because they appeared to be in no hurry to reach Ap Bac, as they searched one house at a time while marching up from the southwest flank of the battlefield. It was also worried about inciting the United States into directly supporting South Vietnam, and had recommended a policy of avoiding battle at all costs. It showed the lack of fighting ability and moral in the South compared … That brings us to January 1963 and the battle of Ap Bac. [1], For the VC, the Battle of Ap Bac marked the first time they stood and fought a large South Vietnamese formation—despite being outnumbered by more than five to one. The VC had set a new record: the battle was the first time they had either destroyed or downed five helicopters within a few hours. He also argued that sending the 13 M113 armored personnel carriers through the Cong Ba Ky Canal would enable the VC to retreat because it might take too much time. [22], At 04:00 on the morning of 2 January, VC scouts around the hamlets of Ap Bac and Ap Tan Thoi reported hearing the sounds of truck and boat engines, so Hoang issued an alert order which prompted his troops to pick up their weapons and hurry to their foxholes. They got away, that's what happened". [27] Vann relayed a message to the command pilot of the ten CH-21 helicopters, which were being escorted by a group of five recently deployed UH-1 Huey gunships, armed with 7.62mm machine guns and 2.75 inch rockets, and instructed him to land the reserve companies about 300 meters (980 ft) from the western and southern tree lines that covered Ap Bac in order to minimize the effectiveness of the Viet Cong's .30 caliber machine guns. On several occasions, Cao's forces were in an excellent position to trap and wipe out whole battalions of VC, but he would fail to close the trap on one pretext or another and allow the enemy to escape. [38], By that stage, Vann was frustrated by the Civil Guard soldiers of Task Force B, because they appeared to be in no hurry to reach Ap Bac, as they searched one house at a time while marching up from the south-western flank of the battlefield. [50], The VC were able to pick off one South Vietnamese paratrooper after another, some as they descended and others when their parachutes became stuck in the trees. [42] Cao had also lost confidence in Vann, because Cao felt Vann had placed the lives of many South Vietnamese soldiers at risk to save the lives of a handful of Americans. Vann then radioed Captain James B. Scanlon—senior adviser to the ARVN 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment—and told him that four US helicopters had either been destroyed or immobilized about 1,500 meters (4,900 ft) southeast of the regiment's position. Despite the change in leadership, the same problems continued to plague the 7th Infantry Division. To make matters worse, Tho failed to send his second Civil Guard battalion of Task Force B to rescue the first. Throughout the afternoon, he continued to press Cao to quickly deploy the South Vietnamese paratroopers. Command of the 7th was given to Cao's chief of staff, Colonel Bùi Đình Đạm. [33] Vann relayed a message to the command pilot of the ten CH-21 helicopters, which were being escorted by a group of five recently deployed UH-1 Huey gunships, armed with 7.62mm machine guns and 2.75-inch rockets, and instructed him to land the reserve companies about 300 meters (980 ft) from the western and southern tree lines that covered Ap Bac in order to minimize the effectiveness of the VC's .30 caliber machine guns. Then as they wheeled in for the fourth time, recalled a crewmen, “All hell broke loose.” From camouflage … [23] Most of the women, children and old men in both hamlets fled and hid in the nearby swamps as soon as the order was issued. [44] It was later discovered that the crew had mixed the incorrect amount of jelling agent with the gasoline. He considered the operation to be a major success: after the Viet Cong abandoned their positions, the South Vietnamese units captured the hamlets of Ap Bac and Ap Tan Thoi. In December, U.S. Army signals intelligence aircraft, using direction finding … [1], Despite the initial success of the Strategic Hamlet Program and the intensified military operations of 1962, the events at Ap Bac placed additional pressure on Diem's government because they showed it was not prepared to cope with the resurgence of the VC, particularly in the Mekong delta. The 1st Company, 514th Battalion, covered the tail of the formation, with one of their platoons acting as a rear guard. The Viet Cong casualties were just 18 soldiers killed and 39 wounded, despite the fact that the fighters were hit by more than 600 rounds of artillery, napalm and other ordnance released by 13 warplanes and five UH-1 gunships. The Battle of Ap Bac was to have been a routine heliborne operation into the rice rich Mekong Delta. [55] Shortly afterwards, more than 18 hours too late, the South Vietnamese hit Ap Bac with an artillery barrage. At that point, South Vietnamese M113 crews backed off while firing their .50 caliber machine guns aimlessly into the sky. In short, the VC enjoyed a great advantage over any attacking force. [19] At 1:30 pm, Ba's M-113 formation finally closed in on the downed helicopters on the western side of Ap Bac. The C-123 pilots changed course to avoid the ground fire, but either the South Vietnamese jumpmaster or the American flight leader did not compensate for the change. M113 Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicle in Vietnam, 1966. In the Battle of Ap Bac, South Vietnam forces (ARVN) were tasked with destroying Ap Bac, a stronghold for North Vietnam forces (PAVN). [25], North of Ap Tan Thoi, three companies of the ARVN 11th Infantry Regiment fared no better. In many other cases, operations were executed on paper only, in order to report an increasing tempo of operations that did not actually exist. [44], The Viet Cong were able to pick off one South Vietnamese paratrooper after another, some as they descended and others when their parachutes became stuck in the trees. [25] Task Force A's momentum was stopped when the soldiers of the leading Civil Guard battalion sought shelter in a dike, where they tried unsuccessfully to outflank the Viet Cong. [59] The VC, however, were more interested in exposing the weaknesses of Diem's regime and its military. Vann then radioed Captain James B. Scanlon—senior adviser to the ARVN 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment—and told him that four U.S. helicopters had either been destroyed or immobilized about 1,500 meters (4,900 ft) southeast of the regiment's position. Dam expressed concerns about his own abilities when the promotion was first presented to him by Diem. [38], Scanlon, with the help of Bowers, ran forward to aid the wounded men and carry them back to the M113 formation. ARVN losses were 80 dead and 100 wounded, with three U.S. advisers killed in action and another eight wounded. Cao promised to deploy the second Civil Guard battalion which had just arrived on the south-western flank of Ap Bac, and to drop the ARVN 8th Airborne Battalion at around 4:00 pm behind Ba's armored personnel carriers. Their targets were the Tay Loc airfield at 16°28′35″N 107°34′7.8″E / 16.47639°N 107.568833°E / 16.47639; 107.568833 (Tay Loc), the 1st ARVN Division headquarters in the Citadel, and the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) compound in the New City on the south side of the river. A stalemate of sorts followed, as South Vietnamese forces took so long to reach these areas that the guerilla fighters were able to retreat with little difficulty. Harkins' evaluation of the battle's success were based on U.S. military doctrine from World War II, in which two armies fought a conventional combined arms battle with the goal to control territory. [47] Vann accused Cao of wanting to let the VC escape in order to avoid further South Vietnamese casualties. Vann hoped to trap the Viet Cong inside the hamlets by blocking their retreat routes on all sides, and annihilate them using an elite battalion of South Vietnamese paratroopers. The US pilots landed their helicopters 200 meters (660 ft) west of Ap Bac, where they were hit multiple times by VC machine gun and small arms fire. Shortly afterwards, more than 18 hours too late, the South Vietnamese hit Ap Bac with an artillery barrage. After a skirmish on a highway that resulted in a small number of South Vietnamese casualties along with several trucks destroyed, Cao was called to Saigon and reprimanded by Diem. It exemplified poor [32], Dam asked Vann, who was circling the battlefield aboard an L-19 reconnaissance aircraft, to reconnoiter possible landing zones on the east and west sides of Ap Bac, where additional reinforcements could be inserted to launch their attacks. The Viet Cong casualties were just 18 soldiers killed and 39 wounded, despite the fact that the fighters were hit by more than 600 rounds of artillery, napalm and other ordnance released by 13 warplanes and five UH-1 gunships. In the last months of 1962, the great prize in Vietnam was the Mekong Delta, an incredibly rich area producing most of the rice and a wealth of other crops in South Vietnam. As mentioned, the Viet Cong were particularly anxious for something to kick-start an insurgency that seemed to be losing some steam in light of American involvement. [9], The most successful South Vietnamese force had been the 7th Infantry Division, then under the command of Colonel Huỳnh Văn Cao. He hoped to pressure the South Vietnamese to accept future changes he favored. After South Vietnamese soldiers had disembarked from the helicopters, one CH-21 was too severely damaged to get off the ground. In contrast, Hoang was far more relaxed and commanded a high degree of confidence from the soldiers of the 261st Battalion. Shortly afterwards, Ziegler returned with Dam's permission, and Ba was ordered to move his M113 carriers in the direction of the white smoke that was rising from the burning hamlet. The infantry units would be supported by artillery, M113 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and helicopters. Darkness finally came to the rice paddies … Throughout 1962, the combined forces were increasingly effective in routing the Viet Cong. As it prepared to land, the main rotor was struck by enemy gunfire. The battle was a significant milestone for the … Because of his attitude, neither the South Vietnamese or the Americans learned important lessons from the battle.[54]. In this battle, several battalions of South Vietnamese forces—overseen by American advisers, outfitted with armored personnel carriers, and transported by helicopters—failed to dislodge several hundred entrenched Viet Cong troops, who later fled under the cover of darkness. "It was a miserable damn performance, just like it always is. In addition, Dam would also deploy two rifle companies at Tan Hiep airfield (10°25′16″N 106°20′10″E / 10.421°N 106.336°E / 10.421; 106.336), which could be brought to the battlefield by helicopters from the US Army 93rd Transportation Company. [17], At 4:00 am on the morning of January 2, Viet Cong scouts around the hamlets of Ap Bac and Ap Tan Thoi reported hearing the sounds of truck and boat engines, so Hoang issued an alert order which prompted his troops to pick up their weapons and hurry to their foxholes. Background. [48] Cao had also lost confidence in Vann, because Cao felt Vann had placed the lives of many South Vietnamese soldiers at risk to save the lives of a handful of Americans. After South Vietnamese soldiers had disembarked from the helicopters, one CH-21 was too severely damaged to get off the ground. Command of the 7th was given to Cao's chief of staff, Colonel Bui Dinh Dam. With the ground attacks in the north and south bogged down, Dam decided to stretch out the defending Viet Cong units by attacking the east and the west. [6], However, South Vietnamese officers were often reluctant to absorb heavy casualties. Diem was man who refused French rule and favored American ideas. The US and South Vietnamese ARVN launched an operation to capture a Viet Cong radio transmitter from the village of Ap Tan Thoi, but they were ambushed and forced to retreat in a major Viet Cong propaganda victory. Cao promised to deploy the second Civil Guard battalion which had just arrived at the southwest flank of Ap Bac, and to drop the ARVN 8th Airborne Battalion at around 16:00 behind Ba's armored personnel carriers. Small-scale mil­i­tary ac­tions, which would even­tu­ally es­ca­late into the Viet­nam War, started in the late 1950s, when South Viet­namese Pres­i­dent Ngo Dinh Diem in­sti­tuted an anti-Com­mu­nist cam­paign aimed at root­ing out "left be­hind" Viet Minh forces. Against overwhelming odds, the Viet Cong achieved their first major victory. However, he was very careful about details. [23], On previous occasions, US intelligence had tracked down the location of Viet Cong radio transmitters, but those were often relocated before the South Vietnamese launched their attacks, so Ziegler privately questioned if the VC had as many as 120 soldiers in Ap Tan Thoi. By 9:30 am, the last of Dam's reserve companies had been airlifted into Tan Hiep, about two hours late because American aircrews were prevented from landing their CH-21 helicopters, known as "Flying Bananas" for their shape, in the heavy fog that covered Tan Hiep airfield most of the morning. [42] Major-General Tran Thien Khiem, Chief of the ARVN Joint General Staff, was present during the argument. Dai was a pro French president who did not have communist beliefs for Vietnam. On January 3, a team of Western journalists toured the deserted Ap Bac hamlet with the American advisors. A relatively small engagement that had major media, political, and policy implications, the Battle of Ap Bac took place between Viet Cong (VC) and Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) forces on January 2, 1963. As American airpower won their first major battle in the Vietnam war poor of... Jelling agent with the South Vietnamese troops with American advisors of CH-21 helicopters offloaded first... 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